Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game by Snellman, Jan E. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
05
54
2v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  1
4 J
un
 20
18
Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game
Jan E. Snellman1, Gerardo In˜iguez4,2,1,3, Ja´nos Kerte´sz4,1, R. A. Barrio5, and Kimmo K. Kaski1
1Department of Computer Science, Aalto University School of Science, FI-00076 AALTO, Finland
2Next Games, FI-00100 Helsinki, Finland
3Instituto de Investigaciones en Matema´ticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas,
Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico, 01000 Me´xico D.F., Mexico
4Department of Network and Data Science, Central European University, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary and
5Instituto de F´ısica, Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico, 01000 Me´xico D.F., Mexico
(Dated: June 15, 2018)
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tenden-
cies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural
economics, such effects have traditionally been illustrated experimentally via simple games like the
dictator and ultimatum games. Experiments with these games suggest that, beyond rational eco-
nomic thinking, human decision-making processes are influenced by social preferences, such as an
inclination to fairness. In this study we suggest that the apparent gap between competitive and
altruistic human tendencies can be bridged by assuming that people are primarily maximising their
status, i.e., a utility function different from simple profit maximisation. To this end we analyse a sim-
ple agent-based model, where individuals play the repeated dictator game in a social network they
can modify. As model parameters we consider the living costs and the rate at which agents forget
infractions by others. We find that individual strategies used in the game vary greatly, from selfish
to selfless, and that both of the above parameters determine when individuals form complex and
cohesive social networks. Dictator game, agent-based social simulation, superiority maximization
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
People’s behaviour towards others lies in a broad range
from selfish to selfless: In the former, individuals are con-
cerned with their own narrow minded benefit like profit,
thus acting competitively against others, while in the lat-
ter they are concerned with the needs of the rest, that is,
they behave in an altruistic and even self-sacrificing way.
How people behave in real-life situations depends on
the social or economic context and on individual char-
acteristics. In order to get a deeper insight into human
behavioural patterns in an economic context, Kahneman
at al. designed the dictator game [1], a two-player game
where one of the players, the dictator, is tasked to di-
vide a given sum of money between both players. The
dictator can divide the money in any way, even keeping
it all. The game was designed to test some of the as-
sumptions of modern economic theories [2], mainly the
assumption of rationality, under which the dictator will
always keep all the money, not giving anything to the
other player. In experiments, however, dictators tend
to give at least a minor fraction of money to the other
player, thus challenging the assumption of rationality of
economic actors [3–5]. It should be emphasised at this
point that the classical theory assumes that the utility
function of the dictator is just personal profit.
The mismatch between theory and observation in the
dictator game is largely caused by social factors, such as
appreciation for fairness and equality, caring for others,
reputation, etc. In other words, the empirical behaviour
of the dictators may be understood as renouncing eco-
nomic advantages to gain social status, such as esteem
of the other player, or more generally a good reputa-
tion. While social status has been studied extensively in
the social sciences, the analysis of its effects in economic
theories (via, say, the concept of bounded rationality [2]
has been more limited). A way to bridge this gap be-
tween human social and economic behaviour is to con-
sider how the wish to maximise social status may affect
social network structure and thus the economic decisions
of individuals. Social relations are a significant part of
the overall social standing or status of people, with both
negative and positive effects depending on the individ-
ual behaviour. Positive effects include increased political
and economic opportunities and social support in times
of need, while negative effects can range from social ex-
clusion to outright hostility. Hence humans usually have
to take into account how their actions affect their re-
lationships with others. In the context of the dictator
game, we could see dictators weighing the worth of the
monetary reward against the penalty incurred to their
social relations, should they be seen to act too selfishly.
The idea of status maximisation as a driving motiva-
tion of humans can be traced back to Adler’s school of
thought of individual psychology [6]. Adler explored the
scenario in which many psychological problems are the
result of feelings of inferiority and, consequently, applied
this idea to develop therapeutic techniques for what he
termed inferiority complex. More recently, we used status
maximisation (referred here as ’better than hypothesis’
[BTH]) as a key mechanism to model the co-evolution of
opinions and groups in social networks [7]. The aim of
this study is to understand how a simulated society of in-
dividuals, driven by status maximisation, behaves when
agents are allowed to freely form economic relationships
but with a utility, where the profit aspect is only one com-
2ponent of status maximisation. To that end we use the
BTH to model the social interactions of agents and their
strategies in the dictator game. Previous agent-based
models have considered the effect of social preferences
such as inequality aversion and a tendency to fairness [8]
but not status maximisation. Here we show how the
drive of individuals to increase their status with respect
to others determines both their economic strategies and
the structural properties of the social network in which
they reside.
Our approach to create a new utility function based
on social status could be considered as an attempt to
restore the idea of rational decision making in the eco-
nomic interactions. However, we should emphasize that
this interpretation has its limits. First, quantifying social
status is highly non-trivial, but it could be circumvented
by making simple assumptions. Second, while profit is
simply measured in dollars (though the value of 1$ is
quite different for a beggar or for a millionaire), estimat-
ing social status has always a subjective component and
it changes depending on the circumstances. Our purpose
with the agent based approach is to test to what extent
people are willing to invest in enhancing their social cap-
ital at the expense of their profits if their comparative
position in the competition becomes better as a result.
The original dictator game is a two player game, where
one of the players, the dictator, is tasked with dividing
a fixed reward between the players at will [1, 3, 4]. It
is different from the ultimatum game introduced in [9],
where the second player gets to either accept or reject
the offer, such that the rejection would result in neither
player getting anything. Both games were constructed
to demonstrate the limitations of rational economic be-
haviour, but in this study we focus on the dictator game.
Assuming economic rationality (or profit maximisa-
tion) on the part of the dictators one would expect them
to keep the whole reward, and not give anything to the
other player. However, in the hundreds of dictator game
experiments in the past few decades it has been shown
that many players, in the role of the dictator, actually
do give out non-zero proportions of the reward to the
other player (see e.g. the meta-analyses in [4, 10, 11]),
which naturally challenges the notion of humans as ra-
tional economic actors. While there is a lot of variation
in the results, the average offers to other player can reach
as high proportions as almost 40%, as can be seen in Ta-
ble I for various studies, The effects of different social
influences on the behaviour of the dictators have been
studied extensively, (see for example, [12] and references
therein), and especially those of social norms (see e.g.
[13–15]). More recently, the effects of social networks,
the players are embedded in, has been studied in [16] for
the dictator game and in [17] for the ultimatum game.
From the theoretical point of view, the experimen-
tal results obtained with the dictator game and similar
games have been interpreted in terms of altruism [10, 18],
fairness, in the sense of inequity aversion [19–21], bio-
logical evolution [22–24], or even experimental artefacts
[12, 25]. Here we study the dictator game by means of
agent based modelling in the context of coevolving social
networks populated by agents, who are driven by max-
imising their social status.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next sec-
tion we introduce the networked dictator game model
and explain the utility function we use for the evolution
dynamics of the game, as well as the model parameters.
Section III contains the results, including the analysis of
the network geometries as a function of the parameters.
In section IV we draw conclusions.
II. THE NETWORK DICTATOR GAME MODEL
Our dictator game model consists of a network of N
agents that form and break social connections to each
other and play the dictator game repeatedly with the
connected agents. The simulation proceeds in cycles, in
which each connected agent plays the dictator game with
all the agents connected to it. Note that for each pair of
linked agents the game is played twice in each game cycle
with the agents exchanging the roles of the dictator and
the supplicant between these instances of the game.
Each agent i is characterised by the accumulated “win-
nings”, or wealth, denoted by vi. For every transaction
of the game an amountM of money is given to the agent
acting as the dictator with its own dictatorial division
strategy, denoted by xi (0 ≤ xi ≤ 1) which is the pro-
portion of M that it gives to the other players. After
each cycle is completed, an amount cM is subtracted
from every agent’s wealth as living cost. For the sake of
simplicity we here assume that the proportion c is the
same for all the agents and for all times. If the wealth
of an agent should go below zero, it is set to zero, mean-
ing that the agent is still in the game. In addition to
their social connections, the agents also adjust their divi-
sion strategies during the simulation with a hill climbing
algorithm,explained in more detail below.
When the agent i plays with agent j, with i being
the dictator, the accumulated monetary reserves of the
agents i and j change by
vi(t1) = vi(t0) + (1− xi)M, (1)
vj(t1) = vj(t0) + xiM, (2)
where t0 denotes the moment of time before the transac-
tion and t1 moment of time after the transaction. When
one takes into account the reduction by cM , the full
amount of accumulated wealth of the agent i at cycle
T1 is as follows
vi(T1) = max
(
vi(T0)+M
(
ki(1−xi)+
∑
j∈mi(1)
xj−c
)
, 0
)
,
(3)
where ki is the number of neighbours of the agent i and
T0 is the cycle preceding T1.
3Study Type Focus Average offers
Engels 2011 meta-analysis general overview 28%
Cardenas & Carpenter 2008 meta-analysis development 34%
Camerer 2003 meta-analysis game theory ∽ 20%
Zhao 2015 experiment politeness 39%
Forsythe et al 1994 experiment real rewards ∽ 20%
TABLE I: Some of the more signicant studies of the dictator game summarized.
The social network of agents was initially set to be ran-
domly connected the average degree 〈k〉, but in the course
of simulations there are no limitations on the degree of
the agents. We deal with an adaptive network [26, 27]:
At the end of each cycle the network is let to reconfigure
through rewiring the connections in such a way that the
agents keep track of how the other agents affect their sta-
tus. Here we assume that the agents compare themselves
against their neighbours, which means that every agent
stores information not only what the other agents have
given to it, but also what was given to its neighbours
and how well they have accumulated wealth in compari-
son to them. For the sake of encouraging agents to renew
their connections after negative experiences, we let their
memories fade over time.
The way the agent i determines the influence of agent
j on its overall status is ultimately derived according to
the BTH change of utility ∆i of agent i. We assume that
the agents only compare themselves to their neighbours
(or, in other words, that the agents only know the accu-
mulated wealth of their neighbours). Thus we can write
the utility as follows
∆i(T1) = vi(T1)− vi(T0) +
∑
l∈m1(i)
(vi(T1)− vl(T1))
−
∑
l∈m1(i)
(vi(T0)− vl(T0)). (4)
To see how the actions of agent j affect ∆i it is instructive
to rearrange the terms of ∆i in the following way:
∆i(T1) = (ki(T0) + 1)(vi(T1)− vi(T0))
−
∑
l∈m1(i)
(vl(T1)− vl(T0))
= (ki(T0) + 1)(vi(T1)− vi(T0))
−
∑
l∈m1(i)/{j}
(vl(T1)− vl(T0))
−(vj(T1)− vj(T0)), (5)
where ki is the degree of agent i. From Eq. 5 one can
see that agent j can influence ∆i in three ways: first
by giving money to i, second by giving money to the
other neighbours of i and third by accumulating money
itself. The amount of money given by agent j to all
connected agents is xjM per dictator game cycle. Thus,
it is possible to define a cumulative utility matrix Uij to
describe how the agent i has benefited from the actions
of agent j at cycle T1 as
Uij(T1) = Uij(T0) + aijU
′
ij(T1) + γij(T0), (6)
where aij is an element of the adjacency matrix:
aij =
{
1, if agents i and j are linked
0, otherwise,
(7)
γij is the matrix of memory parameters, nI is the amount
of agents in I = m1(i) ∩m1(j) and
U ′ij(T1) = (ki(T0)− nI + 1)xj(T0)M
−(vj(T1)− vj(T0)) (8)
The memory parameter matrix γij measures the speed
at which the agents forget how they were treated, and it
is designed so as to reduce |Uij | to zero in time. Thus, it
can be written in the form
γij(T0) =


γ0, if U
T
ij (T0) ≥ γ0,
− γ0, if U
T
ij (T0) ≤ −γ0
UTij (T0), if − γ0 ≤ U
T
ij (T0) ≤ 0
− UTij (T0), if 0 ≤ U
T
ij (T0) ≤ γ0
(9)
where the memory parameter γ0 (assumed to be constant
for the sake of simplicity) is the maximum pace of forget-
ting and UTij (T0) = Uij(T0) + aijU
′
ij(T1). For the sake of
simplicity we also assume that the agents have full knowl-
edge where the accumulated wealth of the other agents
is coming from, so, for instance, the agent i can adjust
Uij even if the agent j is not connected to it.
After each cycle of the game, the agents form connec-
tions with the agents that have benefited them and cut
connections with agents that have not, in other words the
agent i will form a connection with the agent j if such
a link is not already present and Uij ≥ 0, and cut an
existing link with the agent j if Uij < 0.
The agents adjust their division strategies xi using a
simple hill climbing algorithm. At first, the xi’s are ran-
domized, and changed by dx at every step. In the second
step, dx is randomly chosen to be either −0.1 or 0.1.
According to BTH, the change of status of the agent i
in between game cycles is given by Eq. (4), which deter-
mines the further evolution of xi: if ∆i ≥ 0, the direction
of dx is the same as before, but if ∆i < 0, the direction
of dx is changed. Inspired by the simulated annealing
techniques, we reduce |dx| linearly during the first 1000
time steps to a minimum of 0.01.
4A. Motivation of the model parameters c and γ0
The main motivation for including the cost parame-
ter c in the dictator game model is to test the effect of
mutual dependence on the social systems of the agents.
The cost parameter is important from the BTH (Better
Than Hypothesis) perspective, because it can be inter-
preted to represent outside pressure to the agents. Under
the BTH assumption it is not immediately clear whether
the status maximizing agents would form social bonds of
any type, let alone for the purpose of playing the dicta-
tor game. However, it is conceivable that some common
needs might force the agents to interact socially. Thus,
reducing the wealths of the agents by an amount con-
trolled by the parameter c, introduces into the model
an effect that requires agents to cooperate in order to
gain anything in the long run. This then allows us test-
ing whether mutual need enhances social interactions be-
tween the agents.
The potential range of the cost parameter c can in
principle extend to be positive or negative without lim-
its, but will be limited for the purposes of this study by
considering the effects of the parameter to the wealths of
the agents. In order for an agent to make profit in the
model it needs to have a sufficient number of neighbours
that are willing to play the dictator game with them on
good enough terms. When c = 0, the agents retain all
the wealth they manage to acquire from their dictator
game interactions with others for all time, while if c > 0,
their wealths slowly decline if not replenished through
the dictator game. As a direct consequence of these facts
the agents need more and more neighbours to be able to
cover their expenses as the parameter c is increased. If
the agent i has only one neighbour, j, it can generate
profit from their relationship as long as c < 2, if it uses
totally selfish strategy (xi = 0) and its partner is totally
generous (xj = 1). Of course, this arrangement is dis-
advantageous to the agent j, and therefore not likely to
happen, unless agent j happens to have a multitude of
other more generous neighbours. A pair of agents using
similar division strategies can only make profit if c < 1,
but when c is increased, an agent needs at least ⌈c⌉ neigh-
bours with similar division strategy to cover the costs of
its living standard.
As can be seen, the theoretical maximum profit an
agent can make from one relationship per simulation cy-
cle is 2M , while more realistically it can be expected to
amount to about M . In any case, when c is high enough,
the agents cannot cover their costs anymore even if they
form social links with every other agent in the simula-
tion. In a simulation with N agents this point can be
expected to be reached at the latest somewhere between
c = N−1 and c = 2(N−1), depending on the configura-
tion of the social network of the agents and their division
strategies. In this study we do not look into the effects
of “universal basic income”, i.e. the c < 0 case, and we
limit our scrutiny of the cost parameter well below the
upper limit of 2(N − 1).
The function of the memory parameter γ0 in the dic-
tator game model is to allow the agents to reform links
that have once been broken, ensuring the continuation of
the social dynamics. Without the moderating influence
of the memory mechanics in the model, the space of pos-
sible social connections would steadily diminish during
the model simulations, resulting in a very limited social
network.
The interesting range of the memory parameter γ0 can
be estimated using the same procedure as the one used
for the cost parameter c, i.e. by calculating the point at
which the parameter’s influence overwhelms everything
else. Negative values for γ0 would make no sense in our
context, so the lower limit can be set to 0. The maximum
limit can be estimated using Eq. (6), from which it can
be seen that in the case of the memory parameter find-
ing this limit amounts to finding the maximum value of
|U ′ij(T1)|, which γ0 would need to exceed. From the defi-
nition given in Eq. (8), we can see that U ′ij(T1) depends
in a rather complicated way on both the structure of the
social network of the agents and their division strategies,
but thankfully there are only two terms to consider. Let
us denote these terms as
a = (ki(T0)− nI + 1)xj(T0)M (10)
b = vj(T1)− vj(T0), (11)
so that U ′ij(T1) = a− b. Since necessarily ki(T0) ≥ nI , it
follows that a ≥ 0 always.
The term a attains its minimum value of 0 when
xj(T0) = 0, and its maximum value of NM when
ki(T0) = N − 1, nI = 0 and xj(T0) = 1, i.e. when
the agent i is connected to all other agents and the agent
j has no other connections and uses the most generous
strategy possible in the dictator game. Similarly, the
term b has a minimum value of −cM when the agent j
receives nothing from the other agents, and a maximum
value of (2(N−1)−c)M when xj(T0) = 0 and xk(T0) = 1
for all k 6= j. As can be seen, the maximum value for a
can occur simultaneously with the minimum value of b
and vice versa, which means that the maximum value of
|U ′ij(T1)| can be found either in the case where the term
a is at maximum and b at minimum or in the case where
a is at minimum and b at maximum. The latter of these
cases yields the greater value for |U ′ij(T1)|, amounting to
a total of (2(N − 1) − c)M . This is therefore a sensible
upper limit to γ0, since beyond that one would expect the
social dynamics to settle. As in the case of the cost pa-
rameter, we limit our study to relatively small values of
γ0, so we do not approach the upper limit (2(N−1)−c)M .
III. RESULTS
We initialise the dictator game model with N agents
each having a random dictatorial strategy or proportion
of the total amount, xi, the agent gives to the other
player. In the simulation run at each time step each
5one of the N agents in turn acts as a dictator and we let
the system to run for a fixed period of 10000 time steps.
For M we use the value of 1. In this work we focused on
investigating the following characteristic network quan-
tities, i.e. the average degree 〈k〉, the average shortest
path 〈L〉, the local and average clustering coefficients Ci
and 〈C〉 , the mean number of second neighbours 〈n(2)〉,
the average assortativity coefficient 〈ra〉, and the aver-
age homophily coefficient 〈rh〉. In addition, we measure
the susceptibility 〈s〉, which is the second moment of the
number of s sized clusters, ns:
〈s〉 =
∑
s nss
2∑
s nss
. (12)
As in percolation theory, the contribution of the largest
connected component of the network is neglected when
calculating the susceptibility (12). Furthermore, we in-
vestigated the assortativity and homophily coefficients
defined as the Pearson correlation coefficients of the de-
grees k and accumulated wealth v of linked agents, re-
spectively, as discussed in [28] and [7]. It should be
noted that the assortativity and homophily coefficients
are ill defined if agents all have exactly the same amount
of neighbours and if they are all connected to agents
with exactly the same amount of wealth, respectively.
These situations do rise in our simulations occasionally,
and when they do, the results for the assortativity and
homophily coefficients are excluded from averages calcu-
lated. We also calculated the Gini coefficient as a well
known measure of inequality, first proposed by Gini in
1912 [29], using the following definition
G =
∑N
i
∑N
j |vi − vj |
2N
∑
i vi
, (13)
which basically measures the total difference between the
accumulated wealths v of agents.
A. Time-evolution of the model
In order to obtain sufficiently good statistics for de-
termining the averages of the quantities listed above the
simulations of the model were run for 100 realisations,
and time averages over the latter half of the time series
were also taken. The reason for taking the time averages
from the realisations was the very fluctuating nature of
the time-evolution of the model. At times, the entire
social network may cease to exist temporarily, although
these moments only occur within certain ranges of the
model parameters, especially when large values of γ0 are
involved.
In order to study the time-evolution of the properties
of the agents and their social networks in our model we
performed two singular simulations with N = 100 and
two different sets of parameter values, the first set being
γ0 = 0 and c = 5 (case A), and the second γ0 = 5 and
c = 0 (case B). In addition to determining the proper
measure for the averages of simulation results, the main
motivations for these experiments were to test converge
on the other hand, and to see how the model parameters
influence the temporal behaviour of the model on the
other. For example, one could surmise from the very
definition that γ0 could potentially have major effects on
the time-evolution of the social networks of the modeled
agents.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 1. The network prop-
erties seem to generally converge to some constant values
around which they fluctuate, but in case B these fluctu-
ations are very strong. The assortativity coefficient es-
pecially becomes almost meaningless as it can have both
negative and positive values in a very short period of time
due to the fluctuations, implying that the agents have
no clear preference on whether to seek connections with
those of same or different degree. In case A, in contrast,
while there are still relatively large fluctuations in the
value of the assortativity coefficient, the overall value of
the coefficient is clearly positive. While the fluctuations
of most network properties are very rapid, the homophily
coefficient in case A exhibits slowly varying behaviour.
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FIG. 1: The time-evolution of the agent and network prop-
erties when N = 100, with γ0 = 0 and c = 5 (above), or
γ0 = 5 and c = 0 (below). The minimum, average and max-
imum wealths of agents are displayed in the panels on the
left, while the right panels show the hypergenerosity preva-
lence along with homophily, assortativity, clustering and gini
coefficients.
In contrast to the network properties, the time evolu-
tion of the minimum, maximum and average monetary
reserves of agents in the simulations show no signs of
fast fluctuations. Also, it turns out that in this case it
is the parameter c that has greater impact: While in
case B the growth of all of the reserves is almost linear,
in case A the growth of the maximum and average re-
serves stall eventually and finally start fluctuating slowly
around constant values, while the minimum reserve stays
stubbornly at 0. There is thus a substantial difference in
behaviour between cases A and B when it comes to rel-
ative differences between the minimum, maximum and
average monetary reserves of the agents. All the reserves
6reach tens of thousands in value in case B, while in case
A they do not rise above 300. Also, in case A the max-
imum reserves are in the final stages of the simulation
about four times the size of average reserves, while in
case B all the reserves are on relative terms very close to
each other, only diverging very slowly. These behavioural
differences are reflected in the gini coefficient, as it tends
to 0 in case A, and to a value of little over 0.6 in case
B, owing to the more unequal wealth distribution in the
latter case.
B. General characteristics of the social networks
produced by the model
The model parameters c and γ0 have a strong influ-
ence on the structure of the social network produced by
the model and the division strategies of the agents. The
social networks produced by the agents in the model can
vary from very simple to very complex depending on the
values chosen for these parameters. For a reference, a
final state of the social network with N = 100 agents,
c = 5 and γ0 = 2 is shown in Fig. 2. With these parame-
ter values the social networks of the agents produced by
the model acquire their most complex form and exhibit
clearly their most interesting features. Next we explain
what kinds of simpler forms the network may take and
with what parameter values, and how the complex net-
work shown in Fig. 2 emerges from these simpler forms.
When the model parameters are c = γ0 = 0, the net-
works formed consist only of collections of pairs or short
chains of linked agents. The more agents a chain has,
the rarer that chain is in the network. The total amount
of agents in a simulation also determines how long the
chains can get: chains longer than four agents seem to
never occur in simulations of 100 agents, but the chains of
even nine agents can manifest when the total population
in the simulation is increased to 300 agents. The strate-
gies xi employed by the linked agents are invariably most
generous possible, that is xi = 1. This is most likely due
to lack of a reason for the agents to tolerate unfairness
when c = 0, while the disconnected and linear nature
of the social networks formed by the agents is probably
due to the unforgiving nature of relation formation when
γ0 = 0.
Increasing the parameter γ0 from the value of 0 causes
the network structure to become gradually more compli-
cated.While the social networks of agents are generally
disjointed at relatively small values of γ0, the relatively
short chains of agents lengthen as γ0 increases, and at
large values of γ0 these chains become tangled. As γ0
is increased further, this tangledness only increases, un-
til the networks closely resemble that shown in Fig. 2.
At some point the agents start forming densely connected
hubs within the larger networks, which we name as “trade
associations”. The agents in these associations seem to
have relatively coordinated strategies in comparison to
the agents outside these associations, which may be a re-
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FIG. 2: An example of the final state of the social network
produced by our model, when N = 100, c = 5 and γ0 = 2.
The colours of the nodes show the local clustering coefficients,
while the colour of the edges show the proximity of the divi-
sion strategies employed by the agents linked by the edge, as
indicated. The sizes of the nodes correspond to the accumu-
lated wealths vi of the agents, while the widths of the edges
correspond to the strength of the connection between linked
agents, i.e min({Uij , Uji}).
sult of different “grand strategies” utilized by these dif-
ferent types of agents. The agents within the trade asso-
ciations seek fair exchange with other agents in the same
association, which in the context of our model means
having the same division strategies while the agents out-
side these associations generally fall into two categories:
those using relatively generous offerings to attract many
less generous partners, and those agents that in turn
take advantage of the more generous agents, but have
few other social connections themselves. In a way, this
arrangement is reminiscent of the patron-client relation-
ships, and as such we call the more loosely connected part
of the main component ”patron-client network”. As for
the offering proportions xi, the agents generally adopt
less generous strategies as the memory parameter γ0 is
increased, except for the trade associations, whose strate-
gies may be more flexible. In Fig. 2 the network has a
trade association in its lower part, while the rest is com-
posed of a patron client network.
Features that emerge only occasionally in our simu-
lations, but often enough to be noticeable, are totally
connected components that are completely disconnected
from the main network, and whose agents have totally
convergent division strategies. Obviously, these forma-
tions are extreme cases of trade associations, and as such
we call them “cartels”. These cartels can be unstable in
the sense that they may periodically disband and reform,
but they may also be very robust at times.
When the parameter c is increased when γ0 = 0, the
strategies xi gradually become less generous, while the
general structure of the social network remains initially
the same as in the c = γ0 = 0 case, i.e. disjointed col-
lections of small chains of agents. However, when c is
increased sufficiently, the networks finally become more
7complex. The network structure in the case of large c
and no γ0 shows some similarities to the one shown in
Fig. 2, such as clusters of densely connected agents rem-
iniscent of trade associations, but the distinction between
these and the patron-client network is weaker. Further-
more, in the case of large c the division strategies most
often decline to zero for all linked agents. Thus, one
cannot say for sure if any strategy coordination is tak-
ing place. One needs to remember that, while γ0 has a
direct effect on the relation formation behaviour of the
agents, c only has an indirect effect through the term
f = −(vj(T1) − vj(T0)) in Eq. 8, and that while the
former plays a role both in the forming and breaking of
relations, the effect of the latter turns out to be to purely
discourage the breaking of the relations. This is simply
because c always contributes positively to the Uij , since
f =


(c− kj(xj − 1)−
∑
a∈m1(j)
xa)M, if c ≥ ct,
vj(T0), if c ≤ ct,
(14)
where
ct = vj(T0) + (kj(xj − 1) +
∑
a∈m1(j)
xa)M. (15)
Thus, with sufficiently large c and small average degrees
Uij will always remain positive, and no existing relations
are ever broken. Most likely the typical course of a simu-
lation in γ0 = 0 case is that first the all the agents in the
simulation form a fully connected community at the first
time step, and subsequently most of the links between the
agents will be cut until the degrees of all agents with any
connections left are below what are allowed by c, after
which the network remains unchanged for the remainder
of the simulation.
The likely reason for the formation of chains of linked
agents in the low c and γ0 cases is the fact that any offer-
ings by an agent to the neighbours of its its neighbours
weaken the standing of the said neighbours. The for-
mation of the trade associations is probably connected
to these associations becoming socially acceptable when
forgiveness (γ0) of agents allows, or when there is enough
outside pressure (c) to the agents, or a suitable combi-
nation of these effects. Generally it seems as though γ0
on its own has a stronger effect on the network structure
than c, which on its own seems to have a stronger ef-
fect on the division strategies of agents than the network
structure.
The most relevant parameter values are those that re-
sult in the agents having similar division strategies to
those found in the real world experiments on the dicta-
tor game. Since our model is too simple to reproduce the
results of the experiments one-to-one, we focus only on
the most features of these results that are most relevant
in the context of our model. These features are the fact
that, on one hand, surprisingly large proportion of dic-
tators give something to the other player (according to
[11], only about 36% of dictators choose to give nothing,
while the average giving rate is about 28%), and on the
other hand the fact that the distribution of giving rates
is strongly skewed in favour of the dictator, with only
about 12% of dictators giving more than 50% of the re-
ward to the other player according to [11]. In this study
we use the term hypergenerosity for the tendency of the
agents to give more than 50%.
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FIG. 3: The average division strategies (upper panels) and
the prevalence of hypergenerosity (lower panels) as functions
of c with five constant values of γ0 (panels on the left) and γ0
with five constant values of c (panels on the right).
In order to find some values for the parameters with
which our model is able to at least some extent match
the average division strategies and the prevalence of hy-
pergenerosity, latter of which is denoted here by gh, we
performed simulations in which either c or γ0 was kept
constant, and the other was varied. The values tested
were 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5 and 10 for both parameters. As for a
definition for hypergenerosity prevalence we simply adopt
the proportion of agents with xi > 0.5 of all agents.
The results for average division strategies and hyper-
generosity are shown in Fig. 3. Considering the fact that
our agents are driven by the motive of superiority maxi-
mization, hypergenerosity is surprisingly common in our
simulations. Most notably, when one looks the lower left
panel of Fig. 3, one sees that for fixed values of 5.0, 7.5
and 10.0 for γ0, gh stays between values of approximately
0.2 and 0.35 for all values of c, which is considerably
above the 12% proportion reported in [11]. Also, when
γ0 is given value 2.5, gh only drops below 0.12 when either
c . 1.5 or c & 8.0. The highest proportion of overgener-
ous agents, or about 42%, occurs when γ0 = c = 0, but if
c is increased while γ0 is kept constant, this proportion
declines fast to a value only little over zero, as could be
expected from the social network behaviours discussed
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FIG. 4: An example of the social network, when N = 100
and c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2.0, shown in the upper panel. Colours,
line widths, etc as indicated in Fig. 2. A histogram of the
resulting division strategies is shown in the lower panel.
above. While there is some rise with larger values of c,
gh only rises to about 5% at most in the very largest val-
ues of c tested. In general, from the lower left panel of
Fig. 3 one could draw the conclusion that the parameter
γ0 for the most part enhances gh, an observation that is
broadly confirmed by the lower right panel of Fig. 3: For
all the constant c values shown the trends are growing,
at least when γ0 . 1.5
As for the division strategies, it is interesting to note
that when γ0 > 0 the parameter c has relatively little
influence to the strategies, which generally hover around
or above values of 0.25, 0.30 or 0.35, depending on the
value of γ0 chosen. The value 0.30 happens to be rela-
tively close to the value found in [11], while 0.35 is closer
to findings of [10]. Only in the γ0 = 0 case we can see
the strong drop in the generosity of the agents, a phe-
nomenon already identified above in the context of the
social networks. As a function of γ0 the average divi-
sion strategy tends to be generally increasing, except in
the c = 0 case, in which it first declines from a high
of almost 0.5 to about 0.25, stagnates there and then
starts increasing. In all other tested cases the increasing
trends are rapid at first, but gradually slow down as γ0
increases. The values of the average division strategies
approximately stay between the 28% of [11] and 34% of
[10] when γ0 & 2 for the c = 5 case. The same holds for
the c = 10 case when γ0 & 5, and for the c = 2.5 and
c = 7.5 cases when γ0 & 4.
Choosing the most realistic values for the model pa-
rameters, i.e. those that yield the average hypergenos-
ity prevalence and division strategies closest to those ob-
served, involves a careful consideration of the effects of
the parameter γ0. On the one hand, this parameter in-
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FIG. 5: A social network resulting from a run of 400 agents
with c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2.0. A scatterplot of local clustering
coefficients of linked agents are shown in the lower panel.
creases hypergenerosity prevalence, so it should not be
too high, but on the other hand it also increases aver-
age division strategies, so it should not be too low either.
While this dilemma places tight restraints on realistic pa-
rameter values, Fig. 3 shows that with γ0 = 2 and c = 7.5
gh is close to 12% and an average division strategy is
about 0.25, which are very close to the ones observed in
[11], although the division strategy is a little bit lower.
Better match might be found with a more through sweep
of the parameter space, but for our purposes this result
is close enough. Besides, as shown in Table I there is a
great deal of variance between results of different stud-
ies, with some of the older results being as low as 20%.
So, it could be argued that the 25% is clearly within the
spectrum of acceptable results. Fig. 4 shows an example
of the social network generated with γ0 = 2 and c = 7.5,
along with a histogram showing the frequency distribu-
tion of the division strategies. The network is somewhat
to similar to the one shown in Fig. 2, with a trade asso-
ciation and a patron-client network, and relatively dense
interconnections between these two components.
The histogram in Fig 4 shows a distribution of division
strategies of a peculiar shape with at least three local
peaks. The peak at about xi = 0.5 corresponds to fair
division, and such a peak has also been observed in ex-
periments [11]. The other two peaks at about xi = 0.15
and 0.3, however, have no counterparts in the experi-
ments, and there is no peak at xi = 0 (i.e. the point the
agent playing as dictator keeps everything to itself) as
one would expect from the experimental studies. That
our simulated experiments do not correspond one to one
to experimental observations is on one hand not surpris-
ing, since our setup differs greatly from typical dictator
game experiments, but on the other hand the distribution
9of division strategies indicates that the special cases of to-
tally fair (xi = 0.5) and unfair (xi = 0) divisions have no
intrinsic meaning to our agents, a situation which might
change if the agents were made to compete for social
goodwill as well as accumulated wealths.
While the social networks of the agents belonging to
trade associations tend to be fully connected, those of
patron-client networks are characterised by aversion to
forming triangles. This can be seen by comparing the
local clustering coefficients of linked agents, as in Fig.
5, in which we show an example of a larger run with
400 agents, and in which c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2.0. The links
shown in the figure tend to concentrate in the upper right
and lower left portions of the plot, which provides a vi-
sual presentation of the different parts of the full social
network: In the trade association the agents tend to be
all connected to each other, thus they all have high local
clustering coefficients, and so the connections between
them show up in the upper right portion of Fig. 5. The
agents of the patron-client network have sparser connec-
tions and, therefore, lower local clustering coefficients,
and since they also mostly connect with each other, their
connections populate the lower left proportion of the plot.
The social relations formed by the agents that connect
these two communities are rarer, and show up outside
these areas. Especially strong are the sets of points run-
ning vertically and horizontally in straight lines in the
middle of the plot, which correspond to the links of the
peripheral members of the trade association seen in the
network. Since this particular network contains many
agents with only a single neighbour, for whom local clus-
tering coefficient is zero, and these particular agents tend
to connect the more sparsely connected part of the net-
work, there are especially prominent concentrations of
points on the lower parts of the axes.
With the parameter values c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2.0, our
model yields results for average hypergenerosity preva-
lence and division strategies that very roughly correspond
to those found experimentally. While parameters pro-
ducing a better match might be found by combing the
parameter space more carefully, it is also interesting to
ask, what do these (or any other) values tell about the
simulated society of the agents, and what are their rele-
vance to the real human societies?
In the case of the parameter c the answers to these
questions are relatively straightforward: As noted above,
⌈c⌉ is the minimum number of social connections one
needs in order to make profit in the game, when similar
division strategies are used. Thus c = 7.5 implies that
maintenance of the life-style of a single person requires
co-operation with at least eight other people, which sug-
gests a significant degree of interdependence in the social
system. The implications of the parameter γ0 are harder
to quantify, but in the simple system of only two agents i
and j linked to each other γ0 = 2.0 would allow the agents
to continue interacting even in an extremely unfair set-
ting, that is, for example, when xi = 1 and xj = 0. This
may seem to indicate rather radical levels of tolerance of
unfairness on part of the agents, but in the context of
our simulations we had 100 agents instead of only two,
and the average degree of the agents was well in excess
of eight. Since the components of the utility matrix Uij
of the agents change much more rapidly in this situation,
γ0 = 2.0 is really not that high. Take, for example, a
fully connected subgroup of nine members, where agent
1 has a selfish division strategy x1 = 0, while all the
others have hypergenerous strategy xi = 1. In this case,
U ′1j = −16 after one round, which cannot be canceled by
such a small γ0. Thus we can say that the effect of γ0 pa-
rameter is rather subtle in the context of our illustration
case c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2.0.
C. The properties of the network and wealth
distribution
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FIG. 6: The network properties as functions of c. The
linestyles indicate, which of the five constant values of γ0 is
being shown.
In order to get more detailed picture on how our model
behaves as functions of its parameters, we performed
simulations to determine the averaged network proper-
ties mentioned above. Fig. 6 shows these averaged
network properties as functions of the parameter c, for
γ0 = 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10. One of the most noticeable features
seen in the Figure is that in the γ0 = 0 case the behaviour
of the network properties is in most cases very different
to those of other γ0 values, which tend to behave sim-
ilarly to each other. Only the average numbers of first
and second neighbours and clustering coefficient exhibit
somewhat similar behaviours for all γ0 values.
The behaviours discussed in the context of Fig. 2 are
readily apparent in the Fig. 6, especially in the γ0 = 0
case. The steep decline in the number of clusters and the
increases in the average and maximum cluster sizes in
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this case are the most obvious indication of the transition
from the collections of short chains of agents to the more
connected networks as c increases, which is also evident
in the steadily increasing average clustering coefficient.
Average susceptibility and path length give interesting
insight into the intermediate stages of this transition, as
they both spike at c = 2, which is due to the main com-
ponent of the social network becoming a one long chain
or a loop. It would seem that at this point the amount of
agents belonging to clusters outside the main component
reaches a maximum, as does the length of the chains of
agents in the main component.
As stated above, the results for the network properties
generally follow the same trends for all the other values of
γ0 tested. However, for all γ0 the average numbers of first
and second neighbours and the average clustering coeffi-
cient rise as c increases, implying that the parameter c
has a universally enhancing effect on the connectedness
of the agents. Especially the rising average clustering
coefficient might be an indication of growing trade asso-
ciations. As for the number of clusters and maximum
cluster size, the results obtained using γ0 values other
than zero follow the trends expected from earlier analy-
sis, as the former declines and latter increases, although
these trends are not nearly as clear as in the γ0 = 0 case,
and for γ0 = 7.5 and γ0 = 10 the maximum cluster size
is almost constant. Also, when γ0 6= 0 the average clus-
ter size increases monotonically as a function of c, while
for c . 3.5 and γ0 = 0 it actually starts decreasing from
its maximum value after a sharp increase, suggesting re-
emergence of clusters outside the main component of the
network. Unlike the γ0 = 0 case, the susceptibility and
the average path length do not exhibit drastic changes
as functions of c for other values of γ0, although there
may be slight increasing trend in the case of the former
and decreasing trend in the case of the latter. This near
constancy may possibly be due to the fact that the social
networks of agents can already be quite complex at c = 0
when γ0 is large enough, meaning that there is no clear
transition from one type of a network to another when c
is increased in this case, at least no transition that shows
up in the susceptibility and path lengths.
As noted above, the assortativity and homophily co-
efficients tend to fluctuate very strongly in time as the
simulations progress, often changing even signs. Never-
theless, taking averages over these quantities reveals some
interesting details on their behaviour as functions of the
model parameters. For example, both the homophily and
assortativity coefficients have increasing trends as func-
tions of c when γ0 = 0 and generally decreasing trends
otherwise, with only slight exceptions. The values of as-
sortativity coefficient are limited approximately to the
interval between −0.2 and 0.2 when γ0 6= 0, and rise to
little over 0.5 when γ0 = 0. In contrast, the values of the
homophily coefficient stay mostly positive for all values
of c and γ0, except for a point at c = 0.5, when γ0 = 0.
Thus one can draw the conclusion that, while the agents
do not have a clear preference on whether to connect to
similarly connected agents or not in the most cases stud-
ied, they do slightly favour forming connections to agents
with similar accumulated monetary reserves.
Other than the γ0 = 0 case, Fig. 6 contains rela-
tively little information on the effects of the parameter
γ0. While quantitative differences between results ob-
tained using different nonzero values for γ0 exist, they
tend to be small. Some systematic trends can be dis-
cerned, however. For example, the results for maximum
cluster size and average numbers of clusters start at sim-
ilar levels for all nonzero values of γ0, but they tend to
drift apart as c increases. The most striking effects, how-
ever, are seen in the average numbers of neighbours and
clustering coefficient, both of which clearly increase as
functions of both γ0 and c, a trend that is almost linear
for the former quantity. It is remarkable that for c = 0,
average number of neighbours seems to follow the value
of γ0 almost precisely.
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FIG. 7: The network properties as functions of γ0. The
linestyles indicate, which of the five constant values of c is
being shown.
In order to study the effects of the γ0 parameter
more closely, we repeated the same exercise as we did
for parameter c, and calculated the averaged network
properties as functions of the parameter γ0, for c =
0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10. The results are shown in Fig. 7. Just
by looking at the figure we can see similar general issues
as noted in the case of Fig. 6, i.e. the c = 0 case often be-
haves differently to the others, while the results obtained
with other values of c often resemble each other qualita-
tively, with relatively small quantitative differences. In
the cases of the average numbers of clusters, maximum
cluster size and path length, for instance, the results tend
to converge to very similar values and trends for all c as
γ0 is sufficiently high, about 6 in the case of the aver-
age numbers of clusters and maximum cluster size, and
about 2 in the case of the average path length. Even be-
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low these thresholds the results tend to match for c ≥ 5,
while the c = 0 and c = 2.5 cases tend to deviate from
the others.
The general trends are slowly decreasing for the path
length and the maximum cluster size, while the aver-
age number of clusters has a generally slowly increasing
trend. The results for the c = 0 case show trends oppo-
site to those of the other cases for low values of γ0, and
the changes tend to be more drastic. It is interesting to
note that, while the numbers of clusters creeps up and
the maximum cluster size creeps down, the average clus-
ter sizes become almost constant for all c values tested,
when γ0 is sufficiently large. Overall, it seems that the
parameter γ0 encourages the formation of small splinter
groups outside the main component of the social net-
work, thus the results on the cluster numbers and their
maximum sizes.
The results for the susceptibility and path length
shown in Fig. 7 exhibit a similar feature identified in
Fig. 6, that is, a spiking behaviour at γ0 = 1 when
c = 0, which is related to the formation of the long chains
of agents and their linking together, as discussed earlier.
A key difference is that the spikes in the susceptibility
and path length are not nearly as prominent as func-
tions of γ0 as they are as functions of c. Other than the
spike, the results for susceptibility tend to acquire rather
similar values for all c and γ0, although the they drift
apart somewhat as c becomes large. The general trend is
increasing, reflecting the increasing numbers of separate
clusters as γ0 rises.
The average numbers of neighbours and the clustering
coefficient behave rather similarly as functions of γ0 as
they do as functions of c. The general trends are increas-
ing, in the case of the former almost linearly so, with the
exception of very low values of γ0 and high values of c.
The reason for similar behaviour is again almost surely
related to growing trade associations. In the results on
the average numbers of second neighbours, however, one
can see a clear difference of behaviour between the two
cases. While the number of second neighbours tends to
increase as a function of c, as a function of γ0 it is only
rising almost monotonically when c = 0. For all the other
values of c tested it first rises to some maximum point
and then starts decreasing ever more slowly, eventually
becoming essentially constant. The steepness of the in-
crease and the decrease, along with the point where the
maximum are obtained, depend on the value of c tested:
For example, for c = 7.5 and c = 10 the rise is very steep,
the maximum occurs at γ0 = 0.5 and the decline is also
relatively rapid. For c = 2.5 and c = 5.0, in contrast, the
rise is rather slow, the maximums occur at γ0 = 6 and
at γ0 = 3, respectively, and the decline is almost imper-
ceptible. The reason limiting the rise of the number of
second neighbours may be related to the proliferation of
splinter clusters, especially of cartels, since they tend to
be fully connected.
The behaviours of the average assortativity and ho-
mophily coefficients as functions of γ0 is characterised by
relatively slow changes, with the exception of the c = 0
case. While the total change over the full range of γ0
can be significant in some cases, minimal changes from
a neighbouring value of γ0 are the rule. Overall, the
assortativity and homophily coefficients acquire similar
values as functions of γ0 as they do as functions of c, and
therefore similar conclusions apply.
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The wealth distribution, as measured by the gini coef-
ficient, is shown in Fig. 8. Generally, the gini coefficient
decreases as function of γ0 and increases as a function
of c, except in the γ0 = 0 case, which is characterised
by sharp fluctuations as a function of c. Also, in when
c = 0 or c = 2.5, the gini coefficient starts slowly rising
after steep decrease as a function of γ0, contrary to the
general trend. When γ0 6= 0, one sees that smaller the
γ0, the greater the speed of the rise of the gini coefficient
is as a function of c. Conversely, the greater the value of
c, the slower the decline of the gini coefficient will be as
a function of γ0. It can be thus concluded that the pa-
rameter c generally increases wealth disparities between
the agents, while γ0 tends to decrease them for a most
part, at least to a point.
D. The effects of the population number
Most of the simulations in this paper have only had
100 agents due to time and computational constraints.
To test the behaviour of our model with different num-
bers of agents, we performed simulations with N =
50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350 and N = 400 agents, with
parameter values c = 7.5 and γ0 = 2, which were chosen
for their ability to bring the average division strategies
and hypergenerosity prevalence close to those observed
at N = 100, as shown above. The results are shown in
Fig. 9. One of the more striking revelations from this
Figure is that the population number seems to have rel-
atively little effect on many of the results of the model,
especially the average number of neighbours, path length
and susceptibility, which only show very slight increasing
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trends. The gini coefficient also changes little as a func-
tion of the population number, although its general trend
is a very slowly decreasing.
Most important of the results not affected much by
the population numbers are the average division strate-
gies and hypergenerosity prevalence. The average di-
vision strategy show a very slight growing trend when
N . 150, after which there is a slow decreasing trend
until N = 400, at which point the division strategies
have fallen slightly below 0.2 on average. Hypergeneros-
ity prevalence follows generally the very same pattern,
peaking at a value of about 0.2 when N = 150 and
slowly decreasing afterwards to a value of less than 0.1
at N = 400. While the average division strategy and hy-
pergenerosity prevalence obtained from the simulations
clearly correspond to the observations best at N = 100,
which is the point at which the calibration of the model
parameters was made, the fact that they stay relatively
close to the observations raises hopes for the general ap-
plicability of the model. In this study we do not, how-
ever, venture beyond N = 400 in our investigations, so
we cannot say exactly how the system behaves at very
large population numbers.
Of the network properties shown Fig. 9 the maximum
cluster size, average number of clusters, and assortativity
coefficient exhibit the greatest changes and most system-
atic trends, all of which happen to be increasing, while
the average clustering coefficient has a general decreasing
trend, which is rapid at first but slows down considerably
when N ≥ 100. In the upper panel of Fig. 9 we see an
interesting linkage between the average numbers of clus-
ters and maximum and average cluster sizes. While the
increase in maximum cluster size as a function of the pop-
ulation number is a matter of course, the simultaneous
strong rise in the average number of clusters drags the
cluster sizes down. This effect is seen both in the maxi-
mum and average cluster sizes: Although the maximum
cluster size is very close to N when N . 150, the relative
gap between N and the maximum cluster size gradually
widen as N increases, and so at N = 400 the maximum
cluster size is only about 250. The average cluster size,
however, shows a near consistent downward trend, which
is necessarily due to the large number of clusters gener-
ated by the model at ever larger population numbers.
The rising trend in the assortativity coefficient reveals
the changing preferences of the modeled agents in regard-
ing relation formation. While the social networks are dis-
sociative at N = 50, they become increasingly more as-
sociative at higher population numbers. The homophily
coefficient does not share such a straightforward trend,
as it is at times increasing and at other times decreas-
ing, but always positive, meaning that the agents will al-
ways favour forging or keeping ties to other agents with
similar accumulated wealths. It should be emphasized,
however, that both these coefficients, and especially the
assortativity coefficient, are subject to very strong tem-
poral fluctuations during the simulations, so these effects
are only present in the average sense.
In summary it could be said that the results on the
cluster sizes and numbers shown in Fig. 9 indicate that
the model produces ever greater amounts of ever smaller
clusters that splinter off the main component as popu-
lation numbers increase, while the decreasing clustering
coefficient and the increasing assortativity coefficient in-
dicate that the size of the patron-client networks grows
relative to the size of the trade associations. It should be
noted, however, that these results have been obtained
using only one set of model parameters calibrated at
N = 100 to replicate the observed results. We do not
delve deeper into the interaction of the model parame-
ters and the population number in this study.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this study we have investigated the behaviour of
a network of agents seeking to maximize their relative
standings, according to better than hypothesis (BTH).
The agents are embedded in a co-evolving network, in
which the linked agents repeatedly play the dictator game
with each other for evolving their social relations, while
their status is measured by the amount of wealth they
thus acquire. The main motivation of this research is to
test, whether the agents driven by BTH would form any
connections or endow anything to their network partners.
In evolving their social relations the agents in this net-
work game keep track of how the other agents treat them
forming social relations but also cutting them as punish-
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ment of selfish behaviour, and ”forget” their treatment as
well as spend a fixed portion of their earnings for paying
their living costs once per game cycle. The cost of living
and the rate at which the agents “forget” their treat-
ment by the other agents are parameters of our model,
and we have studied their influence to the behaviour of
the system of agents.
Our simulation results show that agents acting along
the BTH do, indeed, form social connections for the pur-
pose of playing the dictator game and that the dictators
in these games often give non-zero amounts of money to
the other players. That the agents would give each other
anything at all in a game such as the dictator game is not
a self-evident conclusion, a priori. The agents can use ei-
ther very generous or very stingy strategies depending
on the model parameters and their position in the co-
evolving network.
Generally speaking, the structures of the social net-
works produced by the model vary strongly according to
the model parameters, and can be described as follows.
For small values of the model parameters the system
networks reduce to collections of short chains of agents,
which become longer as either model parameter is in-
creased. Ultimately these chains start fusing together at
high values of the parameters. The cost parameter alone
does not seem to have as dramatic effect on the structure
of the networks as the memory parameter, but it makes
the agents form more connections, especially in conjunc-
tion of non-zero memory parameter, thereby making the
network denser.
When the parameters are sufficiently large new sub-
structures, which we name ”trade associations” and
”patron-client networks” start emerging. The former are
fully connected subgroups of agents that use relatively
similar division strategies, while the latter are composed
of agents that have diverse division strategies and rel-
atively sparse social connections, with generous agents
generally connecting to many stingier agents that in turn
do not form many connections, and virtually none with
each other. The emergence of these substructures demon-
strates on one hand that the agents driven by BTH are
capable of forming complex social structures using di-
verse strategies, and on the other hand that they can at
some level form social norms. Especially the fact that the
members of trade associations coordinate their division
strategies, indicates some appreciation of fairness in part
of the agents.
The results of our dictator game of networked agents
are in agreement with the empirically findings of altruis-
tic behaviour by humans in the role of the dictator, which
provides credence to the BTH (Better Than Hypothesis).
We find it very interesting that, based on rather simple
assumptions about the competition for superior social po-
sitions, the dynamics generates complex network struc-
tures indicating that this component of human behaviour
may have an important role in producing the empirically
observed structures in real societies. It is also notable
that with suitable parameter values our model produces
average hyper-generosity prevalence and division strate-
gies that are reasonably in line with the ones observed
in earlier research. That BTH could mimic these ob-
servational facts, on top of being capable of facilitating
formation of complex social structures even at such a
simplistic level, is encouraging when considering possible
future uses of the BTH framework. However, it should
be emphasised that as such our model parameters do not
correspond to anything directly observable. In the future
work, parameters akin to the memory parameter could,
for example, be replaced with more detailed social mech-
anisms such as giving social relationships a value of their
own, and letting simulated agents compete over them.
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